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Willelmus de Mandevilla, comes Essexie, omnibus hominibus suis Francis et Anglis clericis et laicis presentibus et futuris, salutem: Sciatis me concessisse et hac carta mea confirmasse in puram et perpetuam elemosinam Deo et ecclesie Sancte Marie Geroldon' et monachis ibidem deo servientibus quatuor carrucatas terre in Estwelle videlicet illas quatuor carrucatas quas monachi habuerunt ex donatione Radulfi Pincerne postquam idem Radulfus dirrationavit terram illam in curia domini Regis.

G. B. ADAMS.

CATHERINE II. AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

THE part played by Catherine the Great in the American Revolution has not yet been fully worked out. The Russian archives are bringing to light much new material on the subject. From the official papers and her private correspondence, examined for the present purpose, one sees that the empress, from the very beginning, had clearly defined views on the rights and wrongs of the American question and on the final outcome of the struggle, as well as a determined policy not to interfere in a hostile manner.

Catherine neither liked nor disliked the Americans. She probably knew none of them personally, and cared little about their theories of government. She took an interest in the American Revolution because it affected English and European politics. As early as June 30, 1775, she predicted that America would become independent of Europe "even in my life-time", and a year later she wrote to a friend, "The colonies have told England good-bye forever". During the years of conflict she never for a moment doubted that complete separation from the mother-country was the only solution. In her private correspondence she does not hesitate to say that the colonies are in the right, that England has provoked a useless quarrel, and that the best thing for her to do is to become reconciled with her former subjects.

Although the empress had a high regard for England she had a very low opinion of the men who were at the head of the English government during this period. In her view, the King of England was a good, fatherly sort of man, but not a statesman, and his ministers were petty, lost in small politics, and quite incapable of taking large views. During the time that they were in office the empress treated them with much contempt.

The first humiliation suffered was when they asked her for troops to go to Canada. Lord Suffolk, on June 30, 1775, wrote to Gunning, the English minister, requesting him to ascertain in an indirect and delicate manner whether Russia would be willing to let England have infantry for America. Gunning had a talk with Panin and the empress and put the question to them in a rather vague way and they

answered in a similar manner; but Gunning felt that they understood him, and replied to Suffolk that troops would be granted. On the strength of this the king addressed an autograph letter to the empress, making a formal request for soldiers to go to America; and at the same time Suffolk sent instructions for the arranging of the details, and a contract which stipulated the pay to be granted to the troops and the amount of subsidy for the empress. This brought the matter to the front, and the request was refused. Both Catherine and Panin assured Gunning that he had misunderstood them; they supposed that he asked for soldiers to go to Spain, but it was quite out of the question to send them to America. Catherine dictated a letter to George III. giving her reasons for the refusal and offering him some uncalled-for advice on the subject which must have made him blush with shame. Gunning first threatened, then pleaded, but it did him no good; the matter was ended; England was humiliated and disgraced.

Through her ministers at London and Paris, as well as through Baron Grimm, who had a regular correspondent in Philadelphia and in addition saw much of Franklin, the empress kept closely in touch with the political situation as between Europe and America. In January, 1778, Harris, afterward the first earl of Malmesbury, who represented England in Russia, was instructed to make an offensive and defensive alliance between Great Britain and Russia. Panin and Catherine drew him on to commit himself more and more. At first they objected to the term "offensive", and demanded fuller explanations. The European political situation at the time being something like this—that England was at war with the colonies and France was about to come out openly against her, while Russia expected to enter into a conflict with Turkey—Harris proposed that England and Russia should attack France, but that Russia should not be obliged to fight the Americans nor England the Turks. Harris, apparently, intended these terms merely as a basis for further discussion, but Catherine had learned what she desired and refused without any qualifications to have anything to do with the alliance on any terms.

When, in June, 1779, Spain also declared against Great Britain, Harris was once more urged to secure assistance from Russia. With the help of Prince Potemkin he obtained a private interview with the empress and pleaded with her to assist England with her navy. She declined and told him that if England desired peace she could have it by renouncing the struggle with the colonies. He begged that she should reconsider her stand, and she yielded so far as to request him to write out his propositions and submit them.

This was done and she paid no attention to them. Harris felt that Great Britain had humbled herself enough, but he was obliged to stoop even lower. On November 26 he wrote to Count Panin that England was eager for peace, that the combination against her was very powerful, that she was willing to commit her interests to the hands of the empress, that if England's enemies should refuse to do likewise Russia might use her forces to end the war, and, finally, that England desired to make an alliance with Russia on any terms whatsoever. For three months the offer was ignored and then it was rejected. To add to England's troubles, Catherine announced her famous Declaration of Neutrality and partly on the strength of this Holland, who had become an enemy of Great Britain, claimed Russia's support in her fight.

During the year 1779 there was some talk of mediation. Harris asked for it and Grimm urged Catherine to offer it, but she felt that the time had not yet come. England was not sufficiently humbled, she was not ready to reconcile herself with the colonies and until that was done it was idle to talk of peace. In September, 1780, she wrote to Grimm to the effect that the time had now come to put a stop to the war. On October 27 she drew up a formal offer and sent it to her representatives at the courts of the belligerent powers. Simolin, her minister at London, read the paper to Lord Stormont, who in turn reported its contents to the king. A few days later Stormont returned and announced that England was ready to accept mediation and that peace could easily be arranged if France and Spain would desist from helping the rebels. At the same time he said that, as Austria had offered to mediate the year before, the king would prefer that the mediation should be carried on by the empress and emperor conjointly. The Austrian court was notified by England of the new development and the offer to mediate was accepted. A messenger was sent from Vienna to St. Petersburg with a request that the Austrian capital be designated as the place for the negotiations. In her letter to the emperor on February 4, 1781, the empress agreed to this and appointed Prince Dimitri Galitzin her minister to represent her. She also outlined the problems before the mediators and suggested a solution. England, she said, will not make peace if the colonies are included in the negotiations, France will not lay down her arms if they are excluded, and under the circumstances they will continue to fight. It was for the mediators to find some way out of this tangle. Her plan of procedure would be this: (1) An armistice for two or three years to include every part of the world where fighting was going on. During the interval the belligerents should have an opportunity

to settle their quarrels without, however, discussing the American question. (2) In this armistice the Americans should be included, but the matter would have to be handled very delicately, because England might suspect that the armistice was merely a trap to force her to recognize the independence of the colonies. To meet this difficulty it should be stated in the act of armistice that Great Britain, desirous of bringing about peace, promised to suspend hostilities in the colonies while she was negotiating with the European powers. Some arrangement must however be made so that England should make peace with the colonies, either separately or collectively. France must be made to promise not to take up arms during the time while England was treating with the colonies, so long as the negotiation was carried on in a pacific manner. (3) France would probably desire to come out with glory and honor from her engagements with the colonies. This could be managed by having her assume the guaranty of the agreements made by England and the colonies.

The proposals submitted to the belligerents were in substance as outlined above. Neither side accepted them; they pleased no one; the point of contention was whether the colonies were free and independent or not. The mediation came to an end. Catherine's pride was hurt and she blamed England for her obstinacy in refusing to give up the colonies and for the stupid declaration that she would rather lose all than give in on this point.

While the mediation proposals were being discussed, the English ministry made an unpardonable blunder in attempting to bribe the empress and influence her course as mediator. On October 28, 1780, Lord Stormont inquired of Harris whether Russia's alliance against England's enemies, including the colonies, could not be purchased for a piece of territory. Harris took up the matter with Potemkin and suggested that England might be willing to part with some territory in America or in the Indies. Potemkin replied that England could gain her point by offering the island of Minorca. Harris advised that the alliance was worth the price, especially because the island in question would serve the additional purpose of embroiling France with Russia. To have carried out the bargain on this basis might raise suspicion. Stormont, in his reply, indicated that Russia need not even help in the war, but that if the empress would use her influence to have France withdraw from the colonies and leave the rebels to their fate, Russia might have Minorca. After peace should have been made, then the alliance could be concluded and no one would be the wiser. Catherine made the most of this opportunity to disgrace the ministry. She told

the story to the emperor, who told it to the King of France, and soon Europe was enjoying the situation.

The coming of Fox into power and the recognition of the independence of the colonies paved the way for peace. Before it was finally concluded the empress was invited twice more to intervene, once conjointly with the King of Prussia, but in the end there was no need of her services.

In refusing to recognize an American diplomatic agent before a definitive treaty of peace was made, Russia meant no offense to the United States. During the whole time that Dana was at St. Petersburg the empress was still regarded as a mediatrix. To have received him officially would have compromised Russia, and wounded the pride of England without in the least advancing the interest of the United States. Whatever could be granted unofficially was offered. American ships and merchants were invited to come, and were assured of as much protection and as many opportunities as those of any other nation. Russia demanded that Dana's credentials should bear a date posterior to the recognition of independence of the colonies by England. This point America could not concede, and out of regard for England and her position as mediatrix the empress could not do otherwise but insist. It was best to put off official relations until some future time.

FRANK A. GOLDER.

OFFICIAL MILITARY REPORTS¹

IN regard to the trustworthiness of diplomatic papers a wholesome degree of skepticism prevails, but historical documents of another class are perhaps viewed by many with too much awe. The standard of honor among soldiers is no doubt very high, and, perhaps for that reason, it seems to be supposed quite generally that a faithful study of the military reports prepares one sufficiently to write the history of a campaign. This is by no means the case, however; and possibly a few remarks based upon our war with Mexico may be thought useful.

Both intentional and accidental misrepresentations occur in the reports, and the former are of two kinds—the legitimate and the illegitimate. It was legitimate for a general, bearing in mind that probably his statements would soon become known, to consider their effect on the officers concerned, the army in general, the gov-

¹ As this paper is merely suggestive, there seems to be no need of supporting it with proofs. These, moreover, if presented in full, would nearly double the length of what is expected by the editor to be very brief; and, finally, it is the writer's intention to bring them forward before very long in another place.